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REPLY TO SMILE ASIANS STATEMENT OF FACTS 
There was no disputed issue of fact below. The trial court had access to the 
entire record of procedural history in this case as part of the court's file. The trial 
court examined the history of the parties' participation in this litigation and based its 
decision to deny BriteSmile's Motion to Compel Arbitration on its interpretation of 
this record. BriteSmile summarized the salient facts of this procedural history in its 
opening brief. Brief of Appellee, 3-13. Smile Asia has provided its own summary in 
its brief Compare Brief of Appellants, 4-10, with Brief of Appellee, 3-13. There is 
no material difference in these two summaries. 
ARGUMENT 
Neither party takes issue with the two-pronged rule applied by the trial court. 
Brief of Appellants, 11; Brief of Appellee, 15-19. This rule was first adopted in this 
state in the case of Chandler v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Utah. 833 P.2d 356 (Utah 
1992), and subsequently applied in the cases of Pledger v. Gillespie. 1999 UT 54, 982 
P.2d 572, Central Florida Invs. v. Parkwest Assocs.. 2002 UT 3, 40 P.3d 599, and 
Cedar Surgery Center L.L.C. v. Bonelh. 2004 UT 58, 96 P.3d 911. Under this rale, 
arbitration is a favored means for resolving disputes and the parties should be required 
to submit to arbitration unless the party opposing arbitration can show: 
(1) Waiver: where the party seeking arbitration has waived its contractual 
right to arbitration by substantially^ participating in the Htigation to a 
point inconsistent with an intention to arbitrate; and 
(2) Prejudice: where the party opposing arbitration shows that "actual 
prejudice" or "real harm" would result if the contract is enforced and the 
dispute is sent to arbitration. 
Parkwest 2002 UT 3, ^ 20; Chandler. 833 P.2d at 360. 
I. THE TRIAL COURT MISAPPLIED THE RULE. 
The trial court misapplied this in two ways. First, the trial court failed to 
recognize that the burden to prove both of these elements is on the party opposing 
arbitration. It was Smile Asia's burden - and a "heavy" one - to demonstrate both 
waiver and real prejudice. See Central Florida Invs. v. Parkwest Assocs., 2002 UT 3, ^ 
24,40 P.3d 599 (citing Tenneco Resins. Inc. v. Daw Int'l AG. 770 F.2d 416, 420 (5th 
Cir. 1985)): see also Britton v. Co-Op Banking Group. 916 F.2d 1405. 1412 (9th Cir. 
1990); In re Complaint of Sedco. Inc.. 767 F.2d 1140, 1150 (5th Cir. 1985); Hilti. Inc. 
V. Oldach. 392 F.2d 368, 371 (1st Cir. 1968); Font v. Paine Webber Inc.. 649 F. Supp. 
462, 466 (D.C.P.R. 1986); Downev v. Christensen. 825 P.2d 557, 389 (Mont. 1992); 
1 The word "substantially" is highlighted because it is an important modifier 
that qualifies the amount of participation required. In its brief, Smile Asia has 
conveniently omitted this modifier from its reference to this rule, ^ee, e ^ . Brief of 
Appellee, 16. As discussed in greater detail below, it is not enough that BriteSmile 
may have "participated in the litigation," as Smile Asia would have it, but rather the 
test requires that such participation be "substantial" and cause actual prejudice before 
Smile Asia can avoid its promise to submit to arbitration. 
WilHams Industries. Inc. v. Earth Dev. Sys. Corp.. 110 S.W.3d 131, 135 (Tx. App. 
2003). 
Second, the trial court treated the prejudice prong as if it could be presumed if 
the first prong was satisfied. R. 780-81. However, unless both waiver and real 
prejudice are established, arbitration is required. Parkwest 2002 UT 3, ]| 5; Chandler. 
833 P.2d at 360. Because of this, many courts first ask whether there has been 
prejudice and, if not, the analysis ends, and the parties are ordered to arbitration as 
required by their contract. See, e.g.. Stockton v. Oppenheimer & Co.. 779 F.2d 885, 
887 (2nd Cir. 1985) (arbitration required notwithstanding discovery undertaken by 
defendant, motion to dismiss, and eight month delay); Danny's Constr. Co.. Inc. v. 
Birdair. Inc.. 136 F.Supp.2d 134, 143-44 (W.D.N.Y. 2000) (arbitration required 
notwithstanding defendant's motion for particulars and more than one year delay); 
Font V. Paine Webber Inc.. 649 F. Supp. 462, 466 (D. P.R. 1986) (arbitration required 
notwithstanding discovery efforts, motions to dismiss, counterclaims, and two-year 
delay); EZ Pawn Corp. v. Mancias. 934 S.W.2d 87, 89-90 (Tex. 1996) (arbitration 
required notwithstanding scheduling conferences, discovery efforts, deposition, 
stipulation to continue trial date, and delay of approximately ten months); Downey v. 
Christensen. 825 P.2d 557, 389 (Mont. 1992) (arbitration required notwithstanding 
discovery completed and substantial delay); The County of Clark v. Blanchard 
Constr. Co.. 653 P.2d 1217, 1219-20 (Nev. 1982) (arbitration required 
notwithstanding defendant filing a third-party complaint and participating in 
discovery and a nine month delay); Williams Industries. Inc. v. Earth Dev. Sys. Corp.. 
3 
110 S.W.3d 131, 135 (Tx. App. 2003) (arbitration required notwithstanding 
discovery, counterclaims, and delay of almost one and one-half years). 
It is also important to remember that there is a "strong policy of the law in 
Utah in favor of arbitration, [and a] strong presumption against waiver of the right to 
arbitrate." Parkwest. 2002 UT 3, ^f 33 & 24. "[A]ny doubts conceming the scope of 
arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at 
hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, 
delay, or a like defense to arbitrability." Id. Tf 24 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l 
Hosp. V. Mercury Constr. Corp.. 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983)); see also Stockton v. 
Oppenheimer & Co.. 779 F.2d at 887; Envirex. Inc. v. K.H. Schussler Fur 
Umwelttechnik GMBH. 832 F. Supp. 1293, 1295 (E.D. Wis, 1993); University 
Nursing Assocs. v. Phillips. 842 So.2d 1270, 1277 (Miss 2003), Williams Industries. 
Inc. V. Earth Dev. Sys. Corp.. 110 S.W.3d at 135. Smile Asia tries to minimize this 
important policy by suggesting that it should not apply unless there has been an "early 
exercise of arbitration rights." Brief of Appellee, 26. There is no such exception in 
the case law. Like the trial court below, Smile Asia ignores the fact that BriteSmile 
did raise and exercise its right to arbitration at the very outset of this litigation by 
asserting it as an affirmative defense. R. 34 & 360. 
The trial court erred when it concluded that the procedural history of this case 
supports a finding of wavier and prejudice. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY IMPLYING A 
WAIVER EVEN THOUGH BRITESMILE 
ASSERTED ITS RIGHT TO ARBITRATION AS AN 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE IN ITS ANSWERS. 
A. The Trial Courtis Error. 
Smile Asia acknowledges, as it must, that BriteSmile gave notice of its right to 
compel arbitration on at least three separate occasions throughout the course of this 
litigation: first, at BriteSmile's initial appearance in an affirmative defense on May 
30, 2002 (R. 34); second, in BriteSmile's amended answer on July 28, 2003 (R. 360); 
and, third, in BriteSmile's Motion to Compel Arbitration on May 24, 2004. R. 677-
685. The trial court erred by disregarding BriteSmile's two pleadings and its 
affirmative defenses, declaring: "[u]nlike the defendants in Parkwest." the BriteSmile 
defendants "never took any measures to 'ensure' that the court knew of their desire to 
arbitrate this matter." R. 780. 
This case is very much like Parkwest. The Parkwest defendant only 
affirmatively raised its right to arbitration in a letter to opposing counsel. 2002 UT 3, 
Tf 30. In the instant case, BriteSmile did much more by pleading its right to arbitration 
as an affirmative defense. R. 34; R. 360. This is a far more appropriate mechanism to 
put the trial court and the plaintiff on notice of BriteSmile's contractual right to 
arbitration than any letter to counsel. See Cedar Surgery Center, L.L.C. v. Bonelli. 
2004 UT 58, Tl 19, 96 P.3d 911 (noting in dicta that the "ideal" procedure "would have 
[been to] raise[] the contractual arbitration clause in an answer to [plaintiffs] 
complaint"). Since the letter to counsel employed in Parkwest was enough to defeat a 
finding of waiver, the two affirmative pleadings in this case should likewise have 
been enough to defeat a finding of waiver. See, e ^ , Tenneco Resins. Inc. v. Davy 
M I , 770 F.2d 416, 420 (5th Cir. 1985); Font v. Paine Webber Inc.. 649 F. Supp. 462, 
467 (D.C. P.R. 1986) ("[T]he filing of an affirmative defense is not to be taken 
lightly,.... A timely defense serves notice on plaintiffs, eliminates the element of 
surprise from litigation, and allows the opposing party an opportunity to argue against 
iV); G.B. Michael and Genossenschaftkraftfutterwerk. Corp. v. SS Thanasis. 311 F. 
Supp. 170, 181 (N.D. Cal. 1970) ("The defendants here clearly and explicitly raised 
their claim to arbitration at the very outset of this proceeding by including a request 
for same in their answer. Courts have specifically held that this factor alone is 
sufficient to defeat a claim of waiver."); Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Borden Co.. 
Inc.. 268 F.Supp. 303, 312 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) ("Courts in this circuit have consistently 
held that there is no waiver when a party demands arbitration for the first time in its 
answer.''); University Nursing Assocs. v. Phillips. 842 So.2d 1270, 1276 (Miss. 2003 
("Waiver of arbitration is not a favored finding, and there is a presumption against it; 
this is particularly true when the party seeking arbitration has included a demand for 
arbitration in its answer, and the burden of proof then falls even more heavily on the 
party seeking to prove waiver."); Downey v. Christensen. 825 P.2d 557, 558 (Mont. 
1992) (recognizing that pleading arbitration as an affirmative defense put the 
plaintiffs "on notice of [the defendants'] intent to rely on the arbitration clause . . . 
from the outset,'' and holding that "[t]his factor alone sufficiently defeats a claim of 
waiver."). 
Smile Asia argues that "aside from their affirmative defenses, Defendants 
never raised arbitration in any of their motions and memoranda." Brief of Appellee, 
26. The flaw of this argument is the obvious fact that BriteSmile did raise its right to 
arbitration in its affirmative defenses. R. 34 & 360. A trial court cannot ignore a 
defendant's affirmative defenses. Parkwest 2002 UT 3, T^ j 33 & 24. 
Moreover, the actions taken by the defendant in Parkwest are similar to those 
taken by BriteSmile in this case. The Parkwest defendant answered, counterclaimed, 
moved to dismiss, held at least one scheduling conference, and participated in 
discovery. 2002 UT 3, T^j 5, 8, 28, 32. All of this notwithstanding, and even though 
the "[defendant's] actions constitute[d] participation in litigation," id, f 28, the 
Parkwest Court held that there had been no waiver - and could be none - because the 
defendant had raised the issue of its right to arbitration in a letter written to opposing 
counsel. Id, ][ 30. The Parkwest Court was compelled to this conclusion by the 
"strong policy of the law in Utah in favor of arbitration" and by the "strong 
presumption against waiver of the right to arbitrate," Id, ^f 24, & ^^ 29-34. "Because 
of our strong presumption against waiver in Utah, waiver of the right to arbitrate must 
be intentional, and inferring waiver from a party's actions is appropriate only if the 
facts demonstrate that the party seeking to enforce arbitration intended to disregard its 
right to arbitrate." Id,, Tf 24. In the instant case, as in Parkwest, There is no "intention 
to disregard [the] right to arbitration" when that right has been expressly invoked as 
an affirmative defense, in a letter, or otherwise. 
Also, the fact that there has been some discovery by both sides is not enough to 
permit the court to infer a waiver and disregard BriteSmile's affiraiative defenses. "If 
participation in discovery and pretrial motions, standing alone, irrespective of the 
parties' intentions [as expressed in the letter to counsel], were to constitute waiver of 
the right to arbitrate, the strong policy favoring arbitration would be damaged." 
Parkwest, 2002 UT, 3, ^ 33; see also. Font v. Paine Webber Inc.. 649 F. Supp. 462, 
467 (D.C. P.R. 1986) (compelling arbitration despite discovery and substantial delay); 
Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Borden Co.. Inc.. 268 F.Supp. 303, 312 (S.D.N.Y. 
1967) (same); Downey v. Christensen. 825 P.2d 557, 558 (Mont. 1992) (same). 
B. The Cases cited by Smile Asia are 
Distinguishable, 
Smile Asia relies on three cases from other jurisdictions, but each of these are 
distinguishable from Parkwest and the many cases cited above. The case in which 
Smile Asia places its heaviest reliance is Mano v. Geissler, 321 F. Supp. 2d 588 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004). In Mano, the court found a waiver, in part, precisely because the 
defendant had not asserted its right to arbitration in its the answer or elsewhere at the 
outset of the case. Id, at 594. Mano is not instructive because it does not deal with the 
factual scenario presented here where the right to arbitration is asserted at the outset 
of the case in an answer or otherwise. 
Smile Asia also relies on Davis v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 59 Cal. App. 4th 
205 (1997). Reliance on Davis is misplaced because Califomia has a different rule 
for waiver than exists in Utah and the other jurisdictions that follow the same rule. 
8 
Keating v. Superior Court. 109 Cal. App. 3d 784, 167 Cal. Rptr. 481, 488 (1980) 
(examining waiver under federal and state theories, noting differences), rev'd on other 
grounds. 31 Cal.3d 584 (1982). This Court should follow the two-pronged Utah rule 
as adopted by Chandler and those jurisdictions that have the same rule. It is 
particularly appropriate for this Court to follow the federal cases (many cited herein) 
that apply this two-pronged analysis. See Buzas Baseball Inc. v. SL Trappers. Inc.. 
925 P.2d 941, 947 n.5 (Utah 1996) (explaining that Utah courts look for guidance to 
federal cases that apply the Federal Arbitration Act because the Utah Act is similar to 
the federal act). When Keating applied the federal rule it concluded that there would 
be no waiver when the defendant had asserted its right to arbitration in an affirmative 
defense. 167 Cal. Rptr. at 488 (noting that when defendant asserts its right to arbitrate 
as affirmative defense, "courts have specifically held that this factor alone is sufficient 
to defeat a claim of waiver"). 
Finally, Smile Asia relies on the case of Board of Educ. Taos Mun. Sch. v. 
Architects. 709 P.2d 184 (N.M. 1985). Support for BriteSmile's position is found in 
this case where the New Mexico court says that "mention of [the right to arbitration] 
as an affirmative defense in the answer to a complaint does suffice to keep the right 
alive," before going on to determine that under the facts of that case there had been a 
waiver. Id. at 187. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BECAUSE SMILE 
ASIA NEVER DEMONSTRATED THAT IT WILL 
SUFFER ANY REAL PREJUDICE BY 
PARTICIPATING IN ARBITRATION. 
A motion to compel arbitration can only be denied if "actual prejudice" or 
"real harm" will result from the arbitration. Pledger v. Gillespie, 1999 UT 54, ^ 19 & 
22, 982 P.2d 572; Chandler. 833 P.2d at 359-360. Mere delay alone does not suffice 
to show prejudice. Pledger. 1999 UT 54, T| 19 & 22; Chandler. 833 P.2d at 359-36; 
Hilti. Inc. V. Oldach. 392 F.2d 368, 371 (1st Cir. 1968); Font v. Paine Webber Inc.. 
649 F. Supp. 462,466 (D.C.P.R. 1986); Williams Industries. Inc. v. Earth Dev. Svs. 
Corp., 110 S.W.3d 131, 139 (Tx. App. 2003). And because there is a strong policy to 
favor arbitration, the required showing under this prong is a heightened standard that 
is a "heavy burden" for the party opposing arbitration. See Central Florida Invs. v. 
Parkwest Assocs.. 2002 UT 3, ^ 24,40 P.3d 599 (citing Tenneco Resins. Inc. v. Daw 
Int'l. AG, 770 F.2d 416,420 (5th Cir. 1985)); see also, Britton v. Co-Op Banking 
Group, 916 F.2d 1405, 1412 (9th Cir. 1990); Hilti, Inc. v. Oldach. 392 F.2d 368, 371 
(1st Cir. 1968); Font v. Paine Webber Inc.. 649 F. Supp. 462,466 (D.C.P.R. 1986); 
Downey v. Christensen. 825 P.2d 557, 389 (Mont. 1992); Williams Industries. Inc. v. 
Earth Dev. Svs. Corp., 110 S.W.3d 131, 135 (Tx. App. 2003). Even if there has been 
a waiver in this case, arbitration is still required because Smile Asia did not meet its 
"heavy burden" of demonstrating that it would suffer any "actual prejudice" or "real 
harm" in arbitration. Stockton v. Oppenheimer & Co., 779 F.2d 885, 887 (2nd Cir. 
10 
1985); Blumenthal-Kahn Elec. Ltd. v. American Home Assurance Co.. 236 F. Supp. 
2d 575, 584 (E.D. Va. 2002); InreRolland. 96 S.W.3d 339, 343 (Tex. App. 2001). 
Smile Asia points to three things: (1) the parties' discovery efforts, 
(2) attomeys' fees incurred in the litigation to date (without evidence that there has 
been any), and (3) the notion that BriteSmile is somehow "testing the judicial waters." 
Brief of Appellee, 31-34. It argues that these things are "prejudice" that prevents 
arbitration. Yet, both below and now on appeal. Smile Asia failed to offer even one 
example of any tangible or concrete harm that it will suffer by participating in 
arbitration. 
A. Discovery Efforts. 
The actual discovery undertaken has not been extraordinary. Each side 
propounded and responded to two sets of written discovery requests (R. 74-75, 177-
206, 245, 259, & 365-66), which involved BriteSmile handing over the key to its 
document warehouse after the trial court granted a motion to compel awarding 
sanctions of $1,330 against BriteSmile for resisting discovery (R. 229, 324-27, & 362-
64). Smile Asia took five depositions (R. 401, 402, 404, 454, 595, & 598). And 
BriteSmile deposed both of Smile Asia's principals - the husband and wife team of 
Dr. and Mrs. Tan (R. 743, 1079, 1088).^ 
Smile Asia disingenuously suggests that it had to incur the cost of bringing 
Dr. and Mrs. Tan from Singapore for their depositions here. Brief of Appellee, 33-34. 
In fact. Dr. and Mrs. Tan voluntarily made the trip to witness the depositions being 
taken by Smile Asia's attorneys. When BriteSmile's counsel learned that the Tans 
were going to be present in Salt Lake, he asked to take their depositions while they 
11 
The trial court erred in believing, as Smile Asia now advocates, that it is the 
mere "participation in discovery'' - without looking for actual prejudice caused 
thereby - that is all that must be shown to meet Smile Asia's heavy burden of 
showing prejudice. Brief of Appellee, 31-32. "Knowing the amount and content of 
discovery is important to determining prejudice," one court explained, and because 
that discovery "may also be useful for the purpose of arbitration, the court should not 
ordinarily infer waiver based upon prejudice." Williams Industries. Inc. v. Earth Dev. 
Svs. Corp.. 110 S.W.3d 131, 139-40 (Tx. App. 2003). See also Pennzoil Co. v. 
Amold Oil Co.. 30 S.W.3d 494, 499-500 (Tex. App. 2000) (same). This, coupled 
with the strong policy favoring arbitration, is why there is such a heavy burden on the 
party opposing arbitration to show "actual prejudice or real harm" resulting from the 
arbitration. Pledger v. Gillespie. 1999 UT 54, ^ 19 & 22, 982 P.2d 572; Chandler. 
833 P.2d at 359-360. 
The trial court erred in assuming that there will be no discovery available in 
arbitration. This is not true, but Smile Asia suggests that this is "so well-established 
that most courts merely note as much in passing." Brief of Appellee, 31. In fact, 
many courts have held to the contrary. In Williams, the court cited to the Rules of the 
American Arbitration Association ("AAA") and cataloged the fact that these Rules 
provide for exchanges of documents and information, identification of witnesses and 
exhibits, and even depositions in appropriate cases. 110 S.W.3d at 140. The court 
were here so that travel costs could be economized. Although they were initially 
uncooperative, the Tans eventually agreed to this. See Addendum 1. 
12 
concluded that because of this, it was error for a trial court to have denied a motion to 
compel arbitration when the plaintiff had not "explain[ed] or show[n] whether what it 
had revealed through discovery would differ from what it could produce at 
arbitration." Id, (citing to the AAA Construction Industry Arbitration Rules available 
online at http://www.adr.org).^ See also Blumenthal-Kahn Elec. Ltd. v. American 
Home Assurance Co.. 236 F. Supp. 2d 575, 585-86 (E.D. Va. 2002) (holding that 
arbitration was appropriate because the discovery undertaken in court was similar to 
what would be available under AAA Rules); Danny's Constr. Co. v. Birdair. Inc.. 136 
F. Supp. 2d 134, 144 (W.D.N.Y. 2000) (same). Smile Asia acts as if arbitrations are 
done by ambush - they are not. 
Furthermore, it is notable that the majority of the discovery complained of by 
Smile Asia was its own. Smile Asia cannot be prejudiced by discovery that it 
initiated, as if the information it obtained through this effort (after moving to compel) 
was something that it did not really need to support its claims. In Downey the court 
rejected plaintiffs who took this position, explaining, "The [plaintiffs] were on notice 
from the outset and, as a result, any actions they took regarding discovery were taken 
at their own risk." 825 P.2d at 558. Similarly, in Lumbermens. the court recognized 
that prejudice should not be found when it is the plaintiff that is complaining about its 
own discovery. 268 F. Supp. 303 at 313. 
The Rules of the American Arbitration Association ("AAA") for Large, 
Complex Commercial Disputes apply to this dispute and, like the construction rules in 
Williams, these rules do allow for discovery, including depositions. Brief of 
Appellants, 18-19 & Addendum 3. 
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For these reasons, the parties' "participation in discovery" does not prevent 
arbitration or make it prejudicial. 
B. Attorneys^ Fees. 
Smile Asia argues that ''Chandler is the only Utah case to address prejudice in 
the context of waiver of arbitration" (Brief of Appellee, 29), completely ignoring the 
recent and highly pertinent case of Pledger v. Gillespie. 1999 UT 54, 982 P.2d 572. 
In Pledger the Utah Supreme Court applied the prejudice prong and reversed a trial 
court for making the same mistake as the trial court made here. Pledger held that the 
plaintiff had not demonstrated that "he [had] incurred significant expenses in the 
district court litigation that would not have been incurred in arbitration." Id., ^^ 22 & 
23. As with discovery, it is not enough to merely claim that attorneys' fees have 
been incurred. If the plaintiff is going to avoid its obligation to participate in 
arbitration, it must demonstrate why those fees will have been wasted if the dispute is 
sent to arbitration. 
What is remarkable about this case is that while Smile Asia claims generally to 
have "expended . . . resources litigating this case," (Brief of Appellee, 33) it could not 
offer an affidavit or other evidence of fees incurred, and it never even suggested how 
its fees, if any, would be wasted if this dispute is sent to arbitration now. Id. 
Without some evidence showing actual prejudice. Smile Asia could not have satisfied 
its "heavy burden," and there was no basis for the trial court to deny BriteSmile's 
motion to compel arbitration. Pledger v. Gillespie. 1999 UT 54, ^^ 22 & 23, 982 P.2d 
572. In Williams Industries, the Texas Court of Appeals explained that: 
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The mere fact that plaintiff has expended funds for legal 
fees is insufficient to establish prejudice. In deciding to 
initiate and prosecute its lawsuit, plaintiff voluntarily 
incurred these expenses and costs. It cannot now be 
argued that these self-inflicted wounds establish prejudice. 
Nothing before us demonstrates that these same expenses 
would not have been incurred during arbitration, or would 
not have provided a benefit to plaintiff in resolving this 
dispute in that forum 
Williams Industries, 1 .. . . mtemal quotations and other notations 
OPMM-n^  <. ning i ranswestem Pipeline Co. \. iionze'i: LJU M Cias C^o.. "^ 0^ ) ^ '/ '' ^ 
589, 593 (Tex. App. 1991)). 
The only specific attorneys' ices hnnic . v .^ia has pointed iv; .> .i.w ;:>... :-•{) 
y,\v ' - RHit^Nmile • '^ ' ^ ' '\ -.i njnu i]i--Mn :^ r\ '• " ""1 "^ ^ 
These fees cannot be a basis for prejudice because BriteSmile reimbursed them when 
it paid the sanction. Smile Asia did not demonstrate any prejudice pertaining to 
3t\i^rui^\-S \'^^ • ]i 1 (> :)iii II It ;: I I ;: (1 ^ hc : o it assii i^ iiied that th/eii;:; had been soiiie. 
C. Testing the Judicial Waters . 
There has been no forum shopping because there has been no substantive 
rulings. / \ 11 : iitstaii£i:iiig disco v ei > lias beeiipi odiM:::ed Siiiile \ sia sa;) s that 
"Defendants have resisted producing their electronic financial information and 
correspondence" (Brief of Appellee, 34), but must admit that this information was in 
where the defendant is moving to compel arbitration on the eve of trial. To the 
contrary, there remains a substantial amount of discoveiy to be conducted, including 
cxpci'i jL^.v ^ J:^ .^. . . - ^ c i a i i j . . •. :v.:. in c hearing, 
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when BriteSmile's counsel explained that "there's still at least a year ahead of us in 
this litigation," the trial court agreed, noting that: "At this rate, its much more than a 
year.'' R. 1162, Tr. page 86, line 23 to page 87, line 1. There has been no testing of 
the judicial waters. It is appropriate to send this case to arbitration because there 
remains substantial savings to be gained in terms of cost avoidance and time saved. 
IV. SMILE ASIA'S EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL 
ARGUMENT FAILS. 
A. This Argument is No Different from the 
Parkwest Analysis. 
This is a new argument that was not relied upon by the trial court in deciding 
BriteSmile's motion. This belatedly-advanced, altemative basis for denying 
BriteSmile's motion does not need to be considered by this Court because it does not 
add anything to the two-pronged waiver and prejudice analysis that the Utah Supreme 
Court has already established in Chandler, Parkwest and Pledger. This Court does 
not need to create a new doctrine or theory regarding waiver of the right to arbitration. 
Even so, this equitable estoppel argument fails on its own merits. 
B, Smile Asia is Barred from Claiming Equitable 
Estoppel. 
Smile Asia's claim for equitable estoppel fails because it has failed to honor its 
contractual obligation to participate in arbitration. "[A] party seeking equity must do 
so with clean hands." LHIW. Inc. v. DeLorean. 753 P.2d 961, 963 (Utah 1988). 
Despite Smile Asia's agreement to participate in arbitration, it breached this contract 
when it sued BriteSmile pursuing judicial remedies in state court. It similarly 
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not honored its commitments, bui ;; row seek„s to use the very fruits of its own non-
complaince as a basis to justii N ii> actions. Utah courts do not allow the equitable 
dcn'Jriot* (irr.slii|'^ |M I lif he used 1'^ , ""Hi"" \\ lio li.'is irriis'.nl 1^ . Jiji t"iniil_ ; Sec al. ."V 
similar position was taken by the plaintiff in Pledger, and rejected. Pledger v. 
Gillespie, 1999 l i :-4. * J L vKJ i _u :• /1 ("We refuse to entertain [plaintiffs] 
arguineiits coil.-er'• ^ ' ..::. = •-.: J ^M-U .^ • - - .liuai'^ '^  '* 
advanced the litigation in violation of his [ajgreement with [defendant]—^whether 
knowingly or not .") Accordingly, this Court should not apply the doctrine of 
eqiti:tiabl(e estoppel i:iith:i s :;.as.e. 
C. Smile Asians Equitable Estoppel Argumeiit l-ails 
Because the Elements of The Claim are not 
Satisfied. 
1he elements of estoppel are not establisht.. .;. :.,... 'wa:->c. ,... elements of 
e^ t(^ ppc^  ir ' - ;idniission, statement, or act inconsistent with the claim afterwards 
asserted, (2) action by the other party on the faith of such admission, statement, or act, 
and (3) injury to such other party resulting iroiii aik; ^ mg me first party to contradict 
or repudiate such admission, statement, or act/"' Plaieau Mining Co. v. Utah DIA . of 
" This argument also applies to Smile Asia's laches argument contained in 
footnote 14. It is Smile Asia who has not honored its commitments, so it cannot now 
claim laches. Moreover, as described in part III, supra, BriteSmile has not been 
dilatory, and arbitration would not harm Smile Asia. Accordingly, the claim of laches 
is not available. 
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State Lands & Forestry. 802 P.2d 720, 728 (Utah 1990) (quoting Celebrity Club. Inc. 
v. Utah Liquor Control Common. 602 P.2d 689, 694 (Utah 1979)). 
BriteSmile's participation in the litigation to date has not been inconsistent 
with its right to arbitrate. As discussed above, BriteSmile asserted its right to 
arbitration on three separate occasions, and has consistently resisted participation in 
this case. R. 34, 360, 677-685. Moreover, Smile's Asia participation in this action 
has been wholly voluntary. It instituted the suit, and there is no evidence that Smile 
Asia has relied on BriteSmile in any way. Finally, as discussed at length above. Smile 
Asia has not been prejudiced in any way by the litigation that has occurred to this 
point. Thus, because compelling arbitration will not harm Smile Asia in any way, the 
doctrine of equitable estoppel does not apply. 
CONCLUSION 
BriteSmile respectfully requests that this Court enter an order reversing the 
opinion of the trial court and holding that, under the facts of this case, BriteSmile did 
not waive its right to compel arbitration and there is no evidence that Smile Asia will 
suffer prejudice by participating in arbitration. The Court should compel Smile Asia 
to participate in arbitration. 
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I hereby certify that on this 2nd day of May, 2005,1 caused a true and correct 
copy of the within and foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS to be mailed 
in the U.S. Mail, first-class, postage prepaid, to the following: 
David M. Wahlquist 
Merrill F. Nelson 
Karina F. Landward 
Kirton & McConkie 
60 E. South Temple, Suite 1800 
Post Office Box 45120 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120 
20 
ADDEND IM 
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WWW kmctaw com 
February 2, 2004 
VIA FACSIMTLE 
David W Tufts 
Durham, Jones & Pinegar 
n 1 East Broadway #900 
Sail Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: Smile lac. Asia Pte. Ltd^ v- Britesmile Management, Inc. at aL 
Notices of Deposition of Plaintiffs Dr, Tan and Mrs, Tan 
Dr.ir T)A\ Id 
I received this morning yonr letter dated January 29, 2004, accojnpanied by Notices of 
Deposition for Plaintiff uuader 30(b)(6), for Dr. Tan, and for Mrs, Tan. In those notices, you have 
sought to schedule those depositions for Tuesday February 24^ through Friday Fcbruaxy 27^' As 
you are aware, we currently have depositions of Defendants scheduled for some and/or ah of 
those dates. As we have discussed over the telephone, Dr. and Mrs, Tan are coming to attend the 
depositions of the Defendants. The Plaintiff continues to object to any requirement to produce 
the Tans in Salt Lake City for deposition. However, as an accommodation, we had indicated a 
willingness to have Plaintiffs Dr. and Mrs Tan deposed the same week that defendants' 
depositions were taken, if possible, 
Pursuant to Plaintiffs 30(b)(6) deposition notices for the Defendants, Defendants 
designated three individuals. Plaintiff has also sought to take the deposition of David Cox. 
Based upon your representations as to anticipated knowledge and deposition duration as well as 
the desires of the deponents, we have been willing to accommodate scheduling some of these 
depositions on the same day and even to accommodate the taking of Mr. Cox's deposition m the 
evening. We have further expressed a willingness to schedule John Reed's deposition to 
commence Tuesday, February 24, 2004, if Mr Reed is available and if we can complete the other 
depositions of Defendants' designated witnesses You liavc not 3^ et responded to tiiis offer 
Yon have requested that Defendants be given four days to take the depositions of the 
Plaintiff and Dr & Mrs Tan. We have discussed the practical problem in fhat there may not be 
four days available during the week currently scheduled for depositions Again, however, as an 
accommodation^ Plaintiff has offered to extend the depositions through Saturday, February 28, 
David W. Tufts 
Febmaiy 2, 2004 
Page 2 
2004 in an attempt to facilitate the taking and completion of the depositions of Plaintiff and Dr. 
& Mrs. Tan. 
Yonr current deposition notices seem to i ^o re this history of discussion and proposed 
accommodation. In tliis regard^ the current notices are -unreasonable and coDllict with the oilier 
depositions scheduled. PlaintifFs Dr. & Mrs. Tan would not be available on some or all of the 
dates you have specified as the Tans will be involved in observing the depositions of Defendants 
and/or of Mr. Cox. 
Sincerely yours^ 
KIRTOI^ & McCONKTE 
fames E. Ellsworth 
cc: David M. Wahlquisl 
733627,1 
JAN/inS E. ELLSWORTH 
jclbworth@kmcliiw.ccim 
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y NUMBER OF PAGES INCLUDING COVER SHEET 
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RE: SMILE i. \''i |i" BmTESMiLE. KI Al 
IF YOU DO NOT RECEIVE ALL OF THE PAGES, 
PLEASE CALL OUR,, OFFICE AT (801) 32S^3600 AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, 
Thib is a confidential communication nnd is not to be delivered or rend by any person other than the ^iddrcsKce. Fncsimile transmission 1.5 not 
intended to -waive the ^ittorney-client privilege or nny other privilege. 11' thii transmi^Hinn is received by miyoiie other than the ftddrc^see^ tlie 
recipient 1H requested tn call Kirtori & MeConkie collect ki (801) 32^-3600, and to immediately return this document tu Kirtori &r McConkie by 
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J O N E S & 
P I N E G A R 
August 31, 2004 
VIA HAND DELIVERY 
James E. Ellsworth 
Kirton & McConkie 
60 E. South Temple, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: Smile Inc. Asia Pte, Ltd, v, BriteSmile Management^ Inc., et al. 
Dear James: 
Please find enclosed a CD containing four .pst files, which files contain the e-mails the court 
ordered our clients to produce for the 5-year period from 1996 through 2001. Our office 
has not received copies of the orders that the Court entered on your motion to compel. If 
these have been entered, you are required to serve a copy on us. 
Attached is a log of those e-mails that are not being produced because they are protected by 
the attorney client privilege. It is our intention to claim this privilege and the attorney work 
product priAdlege for all e-mails to which these privileges apply. As you can see, we have 
conducted a through privilege review. However, as you know, we were under extreme time 
pressure to finish this review and there was a large volume of information to be reviewed. 
Under these circumstances, I remind you of your obligation to notify us if you discover that 
we have inadvertently disclosed any e-mails that contain privileged or other proprietary 
information. (See Stipulation Governing the Disclosure of Confidential and Proprietary 
Information and Order Thereon, If 18.) 
Finally, please also note that we have designated all of the information on this CD as 
"Restricted Information/Attorneys' Eyes Only - Subject to Protective Order." 
If you have any questions or concerns, please feel free to call me. 
Sincerely, 
DURHAM JONES &JRINEGAR 
Chad J. 
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